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Abstract
Philosophical discourse on human rights is broad and contested, and not
all of it agrees with human rights practice. None of the common philosophical
problems, such as the reconciliation between theory and human rights law, the
debate between civil-political and socio-economic rights, or even what sort of
thing human rights are, has been answered definitively. What is uncontested,
however, is the fact that human rights are far from fulfilled in the world today, as
world poverty and inequality persist into the 21st century.
A recent trend across the board—from philosophy to development studies
to human rights practice—is to view poverty as a human rights issue, and see how
the often-divergent idioms of human development and human rights might
converge. This project aims not to solve this problem definitively or answer any
question like “what are human rights.” Instead, it takes poverty and human
suffering as a starting point, and asks what a conception of human rights needs to
look like in order to focus on them. Three approaches to human rights theory are
discussed. I begin with an analysis of Thomas Pogge’s project to make povertycentered human rights amenable to libertarian-flavored views about redistributive
duties. A complex empirical argument is required for his theory to give any real
result, and this seriously constrains the practical efficacy of his approach.
Mathias Risse articulates the problems with Pogge’s account, and offers
an innovative conception of human rights informed by development practice. I
introduce his arguments against Pogge, including his “institutional thesis” that
development and aid are restricted by how they can influence domestic
institutions, and conclude that a middle ground between the two views is possible.
Risse offers a useful four-part schema for thinking about human rights, but his
construal of human rights as membership rights raises serious concerns about his
reliance on an overly innovative idea of common ownership of the Earth and a
potentially misguided conception of the global order.
Out of the dialectic between these two innovative human rights
conceptions, I turn to a more orthodox view based on Martha Nussbaum and
Amarta Sen’s idea of capabilities. I hold that such an approach, while perhaps
open to some standard objections, may be the only way to ground a povertyfocused human rights that reliably unifies development and human rights
practitioners. The responsibilities discharged by such an approach focus on
capacity building through grassroots support, encourage this as an international
concern, and see human rights as guides for domestic policy. To rely on a neoAristotlean thesis is ultimately unsatisfying with regards to many philosophical
issues, but we can accept this based on a notion of sentimentality and a desire to
preserve the strengths of human rights discourse as it is.
I close the paper with a brief account of recent rights-based legislation in
India. The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act guarantees every rural
household a minimum of employment and is a crucial instrumental step in policy
geared toward ending poverty in India. It falls short of guaranteeing a right to
work, but serves a crucial instrumental role in guaranteeing other capability-rights
and provides an institutional ground for duties of assistance.
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Preface
Perhaps the best way to introduce this project is by recounting of how it
came to be. This seems terribly unphilosophical, but how I came upon my
motivations may be the best way to illustrate some of the concerns I hope to
address before diving into a lengthy argument.
I spent the spring semester of 2010 studying abroad in India, living in and
around Jaipur, Rajasthan. Nothing in particular about India motivated the
choice—I don’t particularly enjoy Bollywood film, I don’t study anthropology, I
have little interest in Hinduism or mythology, and I’ve only started doing yoga
very recently. India presented more of a challenge than a semester of fun in
London or Australia or Berlin, and I wanted to take the little I had learned of
ethical theory into the international, developing context that it best applied in.
After five weeks of classes in the city, each of about twenty American
students departed for a five-week field placement with a home-grown
development non-governmental organization (NGO) in the desert state of
Rajasthan. Options were many—some students had done research on what
organization they exactly wanted to work with, some had aspirations to become
teachers, some worked on public health initiatives. My roommate conceived a
yoga-based conflict resolution model for domestic abuse. I had only a deep-seated
sense of injustice at economic inequality and suffering, and a vague conception of
human rights that stipulated I ought to do something to change it. My fervor for a
human-rights approach precluded specific development initiatives in favor of
some pure expression of fighting for rights. I didn’t really have a good idea of
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what that would look like, and now that idea is only a capstone-worth clearer, but
it did lead me on a fairly important adventure.
Rima Hooja, the program director, sensed my indecision. I told her I
wanted to go alone to a rural site, having some puritanical conception of
authenticity and adventure in mind. She suggested Prayas (meaning endeavor,) a
small NGO based in Chittorgarh, and told me of a Khemraj Chatterjee who had
ideas about human empowerment and rights as lofty as mine—and had them since
the 1970s. He had gained a small amount of local notoriety for his persistent
commitment to Marxism even after the wall fell and his stalwart use of the laal
salaam, or red salute, in his village.
Khemraj lives in a compound that Prayas built on the outskirts of the small
town of Bhadesar, in a village called Amarpura. The campus hosts a small school
for poor girls, where they live and study in a collective manner in order to avoid
the dismal state-run schools in rural Rajasthan. (Or to develop revolutionary
tendencies—Khemraj’s motivations were unabashedly mixed, and the walls of the
schoolhouse were plastered with Bharat Singh, the radical independence freedom
fighter, rather than Gandhi.) My time with Khemraj was the most influential of
my field placement, although I did travel to several other Prayas projects in
Rajasthan. My Hindi skills were dismal, and Khemraj was really the only one
around who spoke English at all conversationally. Language barriers prevented
me from doing much useful work around the office, so I observed and reflected,
as a proper philosopher should.
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Khemraj runs a spin-off sister NGO to Prayas so that he can get aid money
more amenable to the particularly Marxist methods he favors, as well as leading
Prayas’ executive board. He named it Pratirodh, which means “resistance.” With
about nine local development workers, Pratirodh serves as a community resource
and catalyst for agitation for social change in the district surrounding Amarpura.
Khemraj requires every one of his staff to visit at least two villages daily, one in
the morning and one in the evening, and Khemraj does so as well. They organize
protests, raise awareness of government services, and act as legal advisors when
problems with the government or moneylenders or power brokers come up. This
entails a conception of the role of NGOs and rights that is somewhat deviant from
the current norm of direct service provision and results-based funding—Pratirodh
functions as a collective of community organizers, opting not to provide services
directly to people, and instead using a small amount of funding to agitate and
develop civil society in order to force the state to realize the rather broad set of
entitlements legally guaranteed. Through agitations and legal advice, the NGO is
a reactive, people-focused organ for community change.
One of the first excursions Khemraj brought me along for was a visit to
what he called a “Nareyga” site. With much confusion, I got Khemraj to admit
that Nareyga was actually an acronym—NREGA. He wasn’t totally sure what it
stood for, so for days I took it to mean National Right to Employment Guarantee
Act and marveled at the audacity of such a project and its concurrence with the
human rights thinking I had been fixated on for six months. The government of
India (GOI) had enacted legislation recognizing a right to employment for all
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citizens—I almost immediately saw a capstone project lurking. We drove out to
an area of scrub brush and walked quite a way looking for the workers. We
eventually found about fifteen women and a few men digging holes in the dry
dirt, working in teams with half-sized picks and shovels and bowls on top of their
heads to dump it into a long mound. Khemraj explained that they were building a
kaccha (dirt) road to a hardly-existent temple. We chatted with the workers and
their supervisor, and I understood almost nothing; Khemraj was too busy to
translate. A woman in a green sari with particularly horrendous teeth started
screaming in the middle of the session, partly directed at me, but mostly directed
to no one at all. Everyone in the circle fell silent and had a linguistically
transcendent look of embarrassment and helplessness until she sputtered out and
stomped off to regain her composure. I asked, as carefully as I could, what was
going on.
“She lost child very young. She went mad.”
There is a theatre to social interaction in rural India, elevating tragedy to
spectacular heights especially when a monolingual foreigner poorly understands
it. Walking away from that woman, and looking back on one picture I happened
to take of her with a particularly endearing grin, forces a degree of empathy.
I visited another NREGA site with a man who used to work at the school
as a cook and hardly spoke any English, so any understanding of what follows has
been pieced together later and is largely colored by my perception. The workforce
there, Narabdiya, consisted entirely in women. They were digging a reservoir out
of the dirt behind their village, similarly using rudimentary tools. Babies crawled
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around in the dirt next to a few of the workers, with huge eyes and wispy black
hair caked in dust. I carried a few head-loads of dirt for kicks, and they weren’t
very heavy. But I’m almost six feet tall and weigh 165 pounds—none of the
women working could have weighed much more than 100 and none of their
foreheads reached my chin. They found me—shoulder-length hair, fully bearded,
and grinning under a load—riotously funny.
The evening before visiting the job site, we visited one of the women at
her home. Her husband greeted us with an incoherency noticeable even through
the language barrier. It wasn’t long before he nearly cried and tottered to the
corner of their compound, where he began to nurse a small bottle of desi (local,
off-brand, and particularly abrasive) liquor. This was apparently a routine. The
woman explained that she had to take up NREGA work because he was
completely incapacitated by alcoholism and persistent unemployment, and she
had no skills other than homemaking. Without NREGA, they’d be completely
indigent.
I learned later that NREGA actually stands for the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act, but that only temporarily ruined the idea for this
project. NREGA is part of a recent smattering of federal laws in India embodying
a rights-based framework encouraged by the idea of convergence of human rights
and development practice beginning with the UN right to development declaration
in 1986 and emphasized in the 2000 Human Development Report. Organizations
like Prayas and Pratirodh have embodied this approach since their inception, and
play a crucial role in NREGA by agitating local governments to follow through
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with implementation and educating people about what legal rights they have.
Largely influenced by Prayas’ work, Rajasthan has become the paragon of
NREGA’s implementation in India. I wondered about the rights-basis of these
laws—might they intersect with some idea of human rights? Must they exist only
in a domestic society? Does human rights even make sense as a lens to view
poverty of the sort that happens in India—slow, pervasive, and systemic?
A lot of this thinking was spurred by Khemraj’s tendency, along with most
other NGO workers I met, to couch their work as encouraging people’s human
rights. I understood that the term “human rights” is open to much ambiguity and
misinterpretation, but the power with which Khemraj used the words struck me—
he clearly understood that the turn of phrase would garner foreign donations, but
the words also seemed to ground his work in something more agreeable and
transcendent than the Marxist/Maoist revolution that never came. (Part of my role
there was, implicitly, to campaign for donations at home. I haven’t)
The notion of human rights itself tends to depend on an international
institutional order, and I thought sympathetically of lofty theoretical explanations
of how that order harms the poor long before I visited the village. One day,
Khemraj and I rode his electric scooter up a hill (it might have been faster to
walk) to visit a small village in the afternoon. An elderly man sat alone on a rope
bed beside the main thoroughfare. He coughed impressively, and Khemraj told
me that he was dying of asthma and too poor to afford relatively simple treatment
for it. The man could hardly speak two sentences without a break for air. The man
asked which village I was from, to which I standardly replied “America,” and
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expected a standard response whereby villagers would usually either shower me
with accolades, ask about president Obama with some or another racial epithet, or
criticize American foreign policy. Instead, this man only looked bewildered, and
after a few proddings, said “I’ve never heard of it.” We asked him to name what
foreign countries he knew of, and after Khemraj suggested “Pakistan” he added
“Gujarat,” which is actually an Indian state bordering Rajasthan to the southwest.
This story, aside from its enduring place in my memory, illustrates an
important point. In the communities that I visited, the global institutional order is
so abstract as to practically not exist. The example of this particular man is
extreme, but if people don’t even know what a foreign country is, what does an
international system mean to them? Approximately nothing. Human rights? This
man was worried about dying peacefully, his grandchildren attending school that
he never had the chance for, and having water for his son’s crops. Human rights
were far from his concern. He may have human rights, but they mean nothing to
him, and all of the other humans they intend to help, if they don’t translate to
tangible outcomes. A human right to political participation is meaningless when a
rights holder has only a vague concept of what politics is; a human right to health
rings empty when the rights holder has never seen a hospital. Human rights
conceptions may be abstract, but people are not—my project here is to find ways
in which human rights can be conceived with that in mind.
Philosophy is concerned with argumentation and abstraction, but I see no
reason that tangible experiences can’t inform the process. Martha Nussbaum has
even suggested that philosophers concerned with global justice get out of the
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library and visit the subjects of their inquiry on occasion, as she did in visits to
Ahmedabad’s branch of the Self-Employed Women’s Association, one of India’s
most notable NGOs.1 My experience in India not only motivated the idea for this
project generally, but it provided some key ideas which I hope to reconcile to
philosophical conceptions about human rights and development.
In what follows, I’ll examine Thomas Pogge’s project to treat world
poverty with strictly libertarian human rights and conclude that a conception of
human rights so reliant on theoretical hope and indefeasible theoretical
conceptions might not mean much for those who need it most—the millions who
suffer persistent poverty. His focus on abstractions and the rich makes sense,
since the audience for philosophy articles and books on the subject will generally
consist in readers at least as educated and affluent as I am. I propose, in the end,
that a capabilities-based approach to human rights allows us to conceive human
rights in such a way to shift the focus to how they can best help those who need
the help, and in so doing blend the theorist’s argumentation with a practical sense
for tangible outcome. The result will be, as I see it, a human rights that radically
empowers humans to demand everything they ought to have secure access to from
those who can best provide it—governments, transnational organizations,
corporations, and someday a usefully strengthened UN. Until such institutional
structures exist, this human rights can provide a justification for laws like
NREGA and a forthcoming Right to Food Guarantee and generate responsibilities
for international actors to deliver targeted assistance that supports the
1

Nussbaum is concerned more with feminist theory in this essay than poverty reduction,
but the idea remains. Nussbaum, “Public Philosophy and International Feminism” pp.
762-796

Grassroots Poverty and Grassroots Human Rights

xiii

implementation of such legal schemes. The international community has such a
responsibility and opportunity with NREGA, and I’ll suggest some ways in which
it can ground the discharge of duties of assistance generated by the capabilities
approach.
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1. Human Rights: General Introduction
Human rights began after the second world war and have become a
contested realm of discourse in political philosophy, international law, and
development studies, as well as generating controversy among anthropologists,
theologians, and radicals. The proliferation of new human rights and the
discourse’s expanding role in many different contexts has been such that “human
rights” might be an essentially disputed term, much like “terrorism,” and thus is at
risk of losing any power it might have had.2 It seems that this may be the case—
human rights have played a serious role in US military action in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and as I write Libya has become the next mini-war of human rightsflavored intervention. Military action in all three can be taken as having serious
ulterior motives, and the use of human rights as a justificatory ruse. The Human
Rights Campaign in the US, with its iconic symbol of a yellow equals sign on a
blue field, is actually an organization devoted to the recognition of LGBT rights
nationally—while these may be human rights, depending on how we specify the
term, the name seems a classic case of appropriating the weight of human rights
for at most a subset of the doctrine. Many undergraduates use the term—“I hope
to do human rights work”—without a particularly rich understanding of what,
exactly, human rights means or how it is grounded. Where human rights gets
involved in development studies, it tends to generate significant tension between
the legal/philosophical aspect of rights and economic/pragmatic considerations of
development discourse. There is philosophical work to be done to find how the
2

Griffin, “Discrepancies Between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and
the International Law of Human Rights” pp. 1-28
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philosophers and world-savers can have common ground, to make human rights
justifiably useful for the absurd number of people suffering in poverty. When
philosophers set out to solve the nastiest philosophical problems with human
rights, they tend to imply abstract actions. When philosophers focus on tangible
people, they tend to invite theoretical tangles.
The task of explaining the philosophy behind human rights has been done
often in sixty years of human rights discourse, making thoroughgoing review of
the philosophical literature difficult and redundant. Rather than rehearse the
standard parts of books summing up human rights—a historical take on the
development of human rights documents, resolving disputes between socialeconomic and political-civil rights, fussing over the legitimacy of international
legal practice, etc.—this project will assess a selection of accounts on their merits
for generating tangible benefits for those who suffer deprivation of them. A
working definition of “conception” will be useful, as each philosopher tends to
use it with a slightly different tint, and some set out explicit definitions of their
own. For now, a conception of human rights will be a theoretical structure
including some or all of the following parts: a list of human rights, a normative
justification for that list, a position on what role existing human rights activity and
documents have to play, what duties are generated by human rights and on whom
they fall, and what sort of things the rights on the list are.
To find a conception of human rights most amenable to producing tangible
change for rights holders, I’ll examine three directions in forming a human rights
conception before suggesting a synthesis, starting with an institutional approach,
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moving to a sort of political approach, and ending with a pseudo-naturalistic
approach, classifications that will become clearer as the argument progresses.
This order is reversed from the standard approach, which tends to begin with the
more historical theories that ground human rights in naturalistic theories, and
move toward contemporary approaches in response to the difficult problems these
raise, most notably the problem of justifying human rights in the face of
accusations of parochialism. In ordering things this way—moving from a theory
that begins with poverty, through one that tries to answer the problems that
generates, to a theory that begins with what humans are able to do and be—I hope
to contribute to a shift in focus from international action to the real, tangible
people a doctrine of human rights is supposed to protect.
Thomas Pogge explicitly sets out to generate a normative basis for a
human rights approach to poverty with his institutional approach. The main
upshot is his suggestion that poverty is the fault of an unjust global order that
generates a causal link of harm from rich person to poor. There is therefore an
obligation to the poor based in purely negative duties not to do wrong. This work
started a lively row with Mathias Risse, who argues that the causal chain is at best
unclear and, instead constructs human rights as membership rights on the basis of
common ownership of the earth. The implications of Risse’s account are still
institutional, but generate weaker, positive duties of assistance in domestic
institution building. I find Risse’s account ultimately susceptible to a potential
flaw in how he conceives the state system and its implication on the global order,
and that in missing the potentially permanent “holey” nature of states he allows
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the possibility for his conception of human rights to perpetuate exclusion. To
introduce a conception that can include all humans and potentially generate the
appropriate tangible outcomes I will sketch a version of Martha Nussbaum’s
conception based on human capabilities. The problems raised by universality may
be ultimately intractable, and the intersection of capabilities with human rights is
controversial, but these consequences, if they are indeed of legitimate concern,
will have to be reckoned with in any account that takes global poverty seriously.
I hope my approach addresses the following problems that have caused me
serious consternation in examining philosophical discourse on human rights: (1)
the global order that each institutional theory postulates may exist as described,
but has little tangible, immediate significance to the humans for whom human
rights matters the most, (2) human rights as they are tend to play a reactive rather
than proactive role in fighting poverty, and a focus on global institutions
perpetuates this bias, and (3) a focus on institutions and what the rich can do
obscures the most effective use of human rights—justifying and motivating
grassroots agitation by rights holders for positive change, while providing a
common ground with and terrain for help from the wealthy.
The most naïve reading of the term “human rights” delivers a simple and
crucial condition that each conception ought to preserve: human rights are rights
that every human has. An undergraduate or Amnesty International advocate might
to add another clause to that definition, “in virtue of being human,” but this is the
very condition that philosophers have tried to work around in the face of
objections from parochialism. Equality, freedom, and dignity are values that tend
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to come along with a naïve reading as well. Where naïveté and philosophy
intersect most uncontroversially is the first requirement that human rights be
universal. There is also a sense that any sort of right generates a corollary duty.
That duty may be positive, meaning that the duty-bearer must do something, or
negative, where the duty-bearer must simply refrain from doing something. Onora
O’Neill makes the point forcefully that a conception of human rights must have
some way to generate and assign duties for it to have any teeth—this is how the
philosopher has a role to play along with the farmer and doctor in the fight against
poverty.3 This duties-assignment usually forms the pragmatic, prescriptive aspect
of human rights that I hope to highlight. Pogge has a similar goal in his account of
human rights, and his unconventional approach has generated a great deal of
philosophical controversy. Controversy seems a great place to start.

3

O’Neill, “The Dark Side of Human Rights”
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2. Pogge’s posited libertarianism and global reform—an innovative stretch?
The main thrust of Pogge’s conception of human rights is to generate an
account that justifies his libertarian development of duties for redistributive
justice in World Poverty and Human Rights. He’s made the account of human
rights there clearer and more concise, but his account of the importance of human
rights’ emergence in the book is valuable on its own. The tools of moralities about
how to treat humans have shifted, from natural law, to natural rights, to human
rights, and the relevant changes show why human rights is particularly important
for modernity. In the natural law idiom, transgressions wrong a supernatural
entity, such as God, and the system generated by that supernatural entity is the
relevant subject benefited by keeping the law, where the good is something like
natural harmony. Natural rights narrow the prospects, by focusing the wronging
on the rightsholder—the shift is a secularization in that the moral subject is no
longer metaphysical or theological. Human rights goes four steps further: it is a
further secularization away from Christian-grounded natural rights tradition,
detaches the rights from a metaphysical conception of nature to the
metaphysically neutral “human,” restricts the rightsholders to “all and only human
beings,” and locates the source of violations especially in positions of authority.4
The first three are implicit in the terminology of human rights, but the fourth
requires some argument that Pogge gives in various forms. If someone is
assaulted on the street in a random criminal action, by someone committing the

4

Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 61-63. This essay first appeared in 1995, and
the development of a specific conception of human rights is much clearer in the later
essay below. The account of the relevant changes in moralities didn’t make the cut,
though.
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crime for the pure satisfaction of committing the crime, we’re loath to call that a
human rights violation. However, if a police officer commits the same assault, or
a group commits such assaults in a systematic way, we might be more inclined to
call this a human rights violation—Pogge counts on this intuition, along with the
fact that many human rights in the documents rely on institutional arrangements
for their existence, to begin to motivate his grounding of human rights as
essentially institutional claims.
Pogge stipulates six conditions for the conceptual aspect of human rights,
which should all be uncontroversial. They must be ultimate moral concerns,
weighty enough to override legal concerns, apply to all and only humans, do so
equally, be unrestricted in time, space, and institutional arrangements, and be
broadly sharable across cultures, nations and philosophies.5 He considers and
rejects three possibilities for whom human rights create demands against: they
might be claims by all humans against all human agents (a naturalistic account),
they might be restricted claims against national governments (a local-institutional
account), or they might be proto-legal demands for all governments to create
constitutional or legal rights to them (simply, a proto-legal account).6 The first,
which pretty much looks like a natural rights account, is unpalatable because of
the constraint that human rights are essentially claims against authority, and for
two other reasons often leveled against human rights as natural rights. Some of
the human rights in practice demand institutional structure, such as the right to a
5

Pogge, “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities,” 159. I’ll follow the development
of a human rights conception here, and inline citations refer to this essay.
6
Pogge uses Ux designations for conceptions of human rights that I find unduly
confusing, although they make for a streamlined way to write the distinctions. I’ll stick to
the names assigned above.
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nationality or representative government. Some necessarily limit the scope of
responsibilities to a domestic institutional structure, such as the right to education.
(160) The local-institutional account has two unfortunate consequences—it
unburdens international actors by overly restricting responsibility to domestic
contexts, and unburdens wealthy residents of poor countries from responsibilities
to their suffering conationals. If the government is the only one responsible for
securing human rights, then individual actors have nothing to do with it. The
proto-legal possibility also unburdens foreign agents, and has the potential to
demand too much in generating extraneous legal rights when a social good is
already enjoyed by other means. A legal right to food might be superfluous in the
United States, where other social factors and guarantees such as public assistance
ensure access to adequate nutrition for all. It also might be the case that agents,
even with a legal right, will have no better access to the good that right exists to
ensure. If someone has a right to food but no knowledge of that right, she cannot
possibly demand it and thus would still starve, her human right unfulfilled.
Before getting to Pogge’s positive suggestion, it’s worth gesturing toward
some issues with his rejections of these three possibilities. First, the fact that a
criminal act isn’t a human rights violation could be a problem with our intuitions
regarding human rights itself. We might regard a criminal murder in Harlem as a
merely criminal act, but this ignores the effects of structural violence on that
murder.7 We could plausibly construct a causal chain from a socio-economic

7

FarmerPaul, Pathologies of Power. Farmer is a medical anthropologist, and paints
global health inequity as a human rights issue. His concept of structural violence has it
that powerful actors can do real violence on the poor: Haitians suffer violence as a result
of a history of injustice and power constellations that guarantee their continued suffering.
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human rights deficit and official abuses that Pogge would consider human rights
violations to the criminal act. Our intuitions about the causes of crime tend to
neglect structural factors. There are cases where the structural influence in a crime
is negligible, such as clear derangement, but these are clear outliers. There are
other arguments about naturalistic conceptions, which will come up below, but
the tendency in our intuitions to overlook structural factors in crime is similar to
the tendency to overlook global, stable background factors that Pogge notes in his
construction of a case for the global order’s role in poverty. While playing this
point all the way out yields a conception of human rights as requirements for a
crime-free utopia, it suggests the importance of the slow-burn approach to human
rights I’ll explore below.
The above arguments Pogge adduces against the local-institutional thesis
are intuitively sound—the negligence of wealthy conationals under a
nondemocratic government where they can claim non-involvement is clearly
problematic. His arguments against the proto-legal account admit the most
obvious objections. It is unclear what the downside of having extraneous legal
rights is—if a society guarantees a right to food universally through other
mechanisms than a right to it, then what is the cost of having a right to food in
legislation? Constitutions might end up being very long, but a set of legal rights
corresponding to basic needs doesn’t really seem to demand too much on that
ground. Legal rights forming guarantees for basic goods could be important if the
social arrangements that currently satisfy those needs are contingent. A society
Pogge doesn’t mention Farmer’s work in his book, but they are both involved in the
Incentives for Global Health project to revise intellectual property law for essential
medicines.
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may have a social structure that ensures adequate access to food, but that access
could fail if, for instance, a particularly bad drought hit. There might even be
redundant social support structures that don’t take the form of legal rights, but
these could arguably fail as well. The most secure way to guarantee basic goods
is to make them legal rights, and hold governments responsible for ensuring
access to goods as a last resort when all of the ad hoc social guarantees fail. It’s
reasonable to think that a government in a well-functioning society would only
very rarely step in, or that a government in a particularly broken society wouldn’t
be able to. In the former case, the rights have no extra cost, and could help clarify
governmental action in the event of extraordinary circumstances. In the latter, we
have a reason for human rights to be a global concern.
There is no reason that proto-legal human rights, with sufficient linkages
between social-economic and civil-political rights, wouldn’t assure that agents
have legal rights to basic needs such that they had a right to sufficient education
in order to demand those rights—in fact, Pogge suggests as much when he
explicates his institutional alternative. Below I’ll discuss Risse’s argument for a
conception of human rights whose duties suggest that international actors’ chief
role is to help build capacity in foreign governments, perhaps through legal aid in
juridification (adoption into legislation) of human rights norms. The conception
has some features of the proto-legal approach in this regard, and doesn’t entirely
avoid the accusation that it unduly lets international actors off the hook, but the
idea that the best use of international resources is in strengthening capacity for
local juridification of human rights is at least worth consideration. There are
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certainly other grounds for dispatching a proto-legal account of human rights, but
Pogge’s arguments here are not entirely decisive.
Pogge’s positive proposal for a conception of human rights situates them
as claims against the global structures of social organization. He bases this claim
on a fresh reading of article 28 of the UDHR: “Everyone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration
can be fully realized.” Rather than read this as another right in the Declaration,
Pogge takes this article to inform the very nature of the rest of the rights therein—
“they are all to be understood as claims on the institutional order of any
comprehensive social system.” (164) Whatever that international institutional
order is, it must be morally evaluated on its amenability to realizing human rights,
where realization is the process of providing reasonable security to the good a
human right looks to guarantee. The claims of human rights are on the order
itself, and against the agents that collaborate or participate in it. (166) The upshot
of this conception is that it generates only negative duties not to actively harm
others through an institutional order. (169) This gets at one of key motivations of
Pogge’s project, which is to make human rights agreeable to a libertarian who
might suppose that the only duties worth generating are negative ones.
Then we can take Pogge’s human rights’ prescriptive outcome as reform
of any institutional order imposed upon those who claim human rights—all
humans, on the relatively uncontroversial requirements above. The phrase
“international” in article 28 signals that there is a way to interpret it to apply to a
currently existent global order, whatever that may be. To make this conception
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usefully assign responsibilities for action to individuals in wealthy countries—
arguably, anyone who will read philosophical accounts of human rights—Pogge
has to succeed in five moves, and these form most of the content of his book.
First, there must actually be an institutional order that has global reach in order to
make the human rights suitably universal. Second, there must be structural factors
in that global order that make it unjust in the sense that it doesn’t adequately
respect human rights. Third, those in the global order must have some causal
connection to it so they can experience the negative duties generated by this
human rights conception. Fourth, the unjust global social arrangements must be
the chief cause of world poverty if this conception of human rights is to have a
serious role in reducing it. Fifth, reform of that global order must be plausibly
feasible, so that it might actually take place. These considerations get away from
strictly normative considerations, but Pogge’s global-institutional understanding
of human rights, and perhaps any project tying human rights with poverty,
demands a blend of descriptive and normative claims about global politics.
The existence of some form of a global institutional order is mostly
uncontroversial—it could be argued simply that the existence of human rights
treaties implies it. The increasing influence of the WTO in liberalizing global
markets since the early 1990’s, the widespread acceptance of the UN, and recent
successes in establishing a (practically toothless) International Criminal Court
confirm the existence of some international political order. This point relies on
some deliberate vagueness in the concept of an institutional order—it falls short
of a governance regime, and must only consist in some coherence in a set of rules
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and agreements that guide conduct among participants in the order.8 The notion
that there is something unjust about this order is almost dogma among those
concerned with human rights, although it is certainly not uncontroversial. Pogge
adduces two specific factors, though, on which he bases this injustice.
International borrowing and resource privileges, whereby any government that
gains control of a country through any means can borrow money from
international finance organs on that country’s line of credit and can legitimately
trade in rights to that country’s natural resources, actively encourage instability in
countries that have problems with human rights. Whoever can take control of the
government through whatever means necessary earns too much legitimacy in the
international playing field. Once a despot leaves office or is deposed, his country
is still responsible for whatever international debts he has accrued, even if the
cash sits in his Swiss bank account, and he likely profited from corrupt allocation
of national resources. These inadequacies in the global order are shockingly clear.
That we need a philosopher to elucidate them is worrisome.
The first two demands of Pogge’s argumentative scheme are easy enough,
but the next three are particularly open to debate. To show that individuals are
morally related to the institutions they participate in, Pogge shows that
representatives who carry out unjust actions do not obscure the chain of moral
contact from the affected party to the decision-maker. If someone has a decision
to make that could cause harm to someone else as a consequence, they often hire a

8

Nickel, “Is today’s international human rights system a global governance regime?,”.
gives a set of requirements for what a governance regime would mean, and shows
descriptively that the current state of human rights institutions doesn’t make the cut. It
can still be a global order, though.
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representative justifiably acting with respect to non-moral ends to undertake the
action. The shareholders of a company may benefit materially from that company
exploiting labor in a morally deficient, although still legal, way. They may hire a
CEO with the explicit motive of maximizing profit for that company. The CEO
justifiably, as per his job description, does what is necessary, within legal bounds,
to maximize profit. Inserting a supposedly morally inert agent between oneself
and those harmed by ones actions, however, doesn’t so block one’s
responsibility.9
This situation is analogous to the international system. We live in a
country where we participate (ideally) in a democracy, so the moral causal chain
at least reaches from the individual citizen to the domestic government. That
government sends representatives to international negotiations that set up
arrangements including the international borrowing and resource privileges
above, because those arrangements benefit our government’s bottom line, as it
were. Having friendly despots in power can ensure access to natural resources, for
example, or provide marginal financial advantages in financing debt to poor
countries. The point is that the realist diplomat does not obfuscate the moral
relationship between the wealthy citizen and the suffering endured by the people
disadvantaged by the social arrangements.10 There exist, of course, serious
objections to this point, but I see no way they can be made in good faith—the
chain of moral responsibility from individual to global order to starving person

9

Pogge, “Human Rights and Human Responsibilities.”
Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. pp. 77-96. Pogge’s example here is of a
landlord evicting apartment dwellers, but it seems more complicated than it might need to
be, and the harms incurred by being evicted are specific but not necessarily compelling.
10
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abroad in cases such as unfair arrangements or deleterious effects of domestic
policy is clearly convoluted, but to deny any connection with the poor abroad
rests upon arguments at least as sketchy as Pogge’s for it. Without taking up the
debate over cosmopolitanism here, I’ll assume that Pogge’s argument for
individuals’ moral connection to international institutions is sound enough, since
the remaining two claims seem the most problematic.
Pogge points out a dismaying tendency in denying the implication of the
international order in extreme poverty that causes 18 million deaths a year. He
calls it “explanatory nationalism,” a bias that ignores international structural
effects such as the privileges above in causal considerations of poverty.11 The
explanatory nationalist might claim that local geographical factors such as
resource scarcity might be the chief issue—but it’s obvious that resource-rich
countries tend to suffer the most instability and underfulfillment of human rights,
a so-called “resource curse” or “paradox of plenty”12 Explanatory nationalism
could push further from here: inadequate governments mismanage what resources
poor countries do have and therefore incur chief responsibility for poverty. But
the international institutional structure, with the resource and borrowing
privileges, encourages despotic and incompetent governance, so Pogge argues.
His conclusion here is that we must consider both national and international
factors in poverty, which is fairly obvious once we understand that our intuition
tends to ignore structural factors and in light of the two examples of global
11

Ibid., 116-118.
KhanIrene, The Unheard Truth: Poverty and Human Rights, 171-199. Khan, current
secretary general of Amnesty International, describes this phenomenon in great detail in
her chapter “Commodoties Boom, Rights Bust.” She includes references to the
development literature on p. 175
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structural violence that he points out. But he argues too much when he states,
“features of the global institutional order are the decisive variable for the
realization of human rights today…” (185, my emphasis) This is a huge claim—
rather than simply accept that we must consider both national and global causal
factors for the underfulfillment of human rights, Pogge argues, at least in his
essay in De Greiff and Cronin’s collection, that the global factors are the chief
cause. Significant, potentially impossible empirical work would be necessary to
really confirm this, and Pogge’s mixed normative-empirical arguments for it
aren’t entirely convincing. This step isn’t necessary to produce some negative
duties of rectification, even—Pogge just needs to show that the global order has
some impact on poverty that is weighty enough for a human-rights-flavored
negative right, as he arguably has. The relative immediacy of negative duties over
potential positive duties should be enough to compensate for the fact that they
might not be the weightiest factor in suffering.
Consider a counterargument—in a country that has a relatively sound
system of governance, like India, the world’s largest democracy, we could still
argue that much of that country’s population suffers extreme deprivation. To say
that the international resource and borrowing privileges are chiefly responsible for
this seems absurd, since India has never experienced a military coup and, with the
exception of Indira Gandhi’s zany imposition of a national emergency rule in the
1970’s, has maintained a relatively vibrant democracy since 1948. There are
many reasons that much of India suffers severe poverty, but to pick out colonial
history or recently liberalized markets as the main cause is a bygone effort of
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dependency theory.13 Worse, it can create a dependency attitude and absolve, if
not normatively, practically, the role of domestic agents in eradicating poverty—
exactly what Pogge wanted to avoid in refuting the local-institutional picture of
human rights. The international community shouldn’t be let off the hook, but
arguing that it is the chief cause of poverty is a step too far.
Alan Patten terms the tendency in Pogge’s book to assign the main cause
of poverty to international factors “explanatory cosmopolitanism:” “Explanatory
cosmopolitanism is an implausible view because even in a fair international
environment there is no guarantee that the policies needed to fight poverty will be
introduced domestically… we know from the domestic politics of the developed
countries that even fairly democratic countries, operating under an international
set of rules that have been shaped for their own advantage, can routinely fail to
enact policies designed to help their poorest and most marginalized citizens.”14
Amartya Sen’s favorite statistic that African-American males in US urban centers
fare worse than sub-Saharan Africans on a number of development indicators is
hardly necessary to underscore this fact. Patten is more charitable toward Pogge,
though, noting that he elsewhere uses more permissive language in claiming the
primacy of the institutional order’s fault in global poverty. Patten makes a
compelling point—if Pogge avoids explanatory cosmopolitanism, and poverty can
still persist even with a reformed global order, then the libertarian outlook on
human rights will ensure that poverty remains and people still suffer. Some
positive rights will be necessary to finish the project of eliminating poverty, and
13

Risse, “How does the global order harm the poor?,”. Risse quotes Velasco’s
denunciation of dependency theory in a footnote.
14
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then it isn’t clear that Pogge’s project of restricting human rights to negative
rights has any upshot at all.
Much of the assignment of duties under a libertarian schema requires a
specification of a baseline for harm that most commentators in the Ethics and
International Affairs symposium on Pogge did not find a compelling argument for
in his book. Patten suggests a “substantive baseline” where the global order
causes harm as long as no one falls below a standard of subsistence as opposed to
the “procedural baseline” where the arrangements are harmful because of the
unfairness sketched above. If the substantive baseline is the way around
explanatory cosmopolitanism, Pogge’s normative reliance on libertarianism is no
longer plausible—ensuring a sort of basket of goods or resources is obviously
beyond the scope of purely negative duties. Aside from being outside the bounds
of the stipulated libertarian framework, such extensive redistributive measures in
any global order seem implausible at first glance.
Pogge’s last burden that I’ve adduced is to show that reform is possible. It
seems clear that the international borrowing and resource privileges are
unnecessary in the international system, and he argues that changing this, among
other reforms, is “the preeminent moral task of our time.” (179) Pogge may
overstate how easy the task of reform will be, but we can easily assent to the idea
that it’s possible. His suggestions, such as the Tobin tax on currency exchange or
a global resource dividend that puts a cut from resource transfer into a global pot
for the poor, are compelling—but clearly more aspirational than practical
suggestions. US president Barack Obama’s 2011 State of the Union address was
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entitled “Winning the Future.”15 I didn’t notice any commentary in media outlets
suggesting that “winning” isn’t the point of international relations, or even a
cogent idea in a world where the “winners”—namely, us, the rich—stand any
chance of becoming “losers.” As long as national discourse blithely accepts and
cheers on patriotic conceptions of winning, we can hardly expect the political will
for any cosmopolitan proposals intended to let the winners be and help the poor
change their standing. Pogge’s suggestions are useful for informing very longrange policy and political philosophy, but their realization is unlikely even in my
lifetime, let alone the lifetimes of the people they’re supposed to help. Hopeful
and radical propositions for reforming global politics clearly have a place in
human rights discourse, but the urgency of poverty that Pogge stresses requires us
to emphasize more immediate, practical solutions.
Pogge’s claims that his institutional stance delivers solutions to standard
theoretical issues in human rights discourse, and they are worth considering along
with the more empirical difficulties I’ve raised so far. Most importantly, Pogge
claims that the institutional interpretation resolves the Cold War hangover of
separating social and economic rights from social and political rights. Since all
human rights only generate negative duties, there isn’t any conflict in kind
between the usually positive social and economic rights and usually negative civil
and political rights. Pogge also presents an institutional version of “linkage
arguments” made by Henry Shue in the 1970s. In bare outline, the argument
shows that civil and political rights are useless if someone is so poor or
15
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uneducated that they can’t exercise political freedoms, and economic and social
rights require civil and political freedoms to ensure appropriate actualization in
policy. It might be the case that Pogge’s institutional emphasis isn’t really
necessary for this criterion, and it isn’t really clear how this part of the argument
differs in any significant way from Shue’s.16 Most obviously, Pogge’s account
makes human rights universal simply by definition—there can only be one global
institutional order, and while human rights are a standard for assessing the moral
value of that order, they must be unified and universal. The institutional approach
doesn’t necessarily the most effective theoretical answers to these concerns, but
the answers Pogge gives are strong enough. The possibility of any best
philosophical account—however much Griffin insists that his minimalist
approach is the best going—is doubtful, as any reasonable survey of human rights
literature yields. As I’ve suggested above, the path forward lies in focusing on the
outcomes of theoretical work, how the theory will generate tangible benefits for
the poor.

16

Mieth, “World poverty as a problem of justice? A critical comparison of three
approaches,”. Mieth gives an excellent discussion and concludes that positive duties as
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3. Risse’s “institutional thesis” and further concerns
The previous section showed that Pogge must rely on a set of empirical
claims for his account of human rights to have an effect on world poverty, the
goal suggested by his seminal book’s title. The empirical chain from negative
rights to moral culpability is clearly the weakest point of the account. Mathias
Risse makes powerful arguments in opposition to Pogges empirical conjectures,
and proposes an account of human rights nearly as innovative as Pogge’s based
on common ownership of the Earth. His response to Pogge is represented by three
essays: “Do We Owe the Global Poor Assistance or Rectification?” part of the
Ethics and International Affairs symposium on Pogge’s book, “How Does the
Global Order Harm the Poor?,” which fills out the argument against Pogge’s
empirical sketches, and “What We Owe to the Global Poor” which provides a
more thorough engagement with both Rawls’ conception of institutional change
and Pogge’s cosmopolitanism. Risse relies on an empirical “institutional thesis”
from Dani Rodrik and others’ work in development economics to motivate his
arguments, and concludes that the global order has done more good than harm in
the long run. The only harm for which the global order can be held responsible is
fairly weak, consisting in wealthy nations’ failure to assist developing nations in
institutional capacity building. Given the assumed institutional thesis, such
capacity-building assistance is all that will make it into Risse’s positive
international duties. The institutional thesis is a valuable idea in development
economics explanations of growth, but may miss some key features of a human
rights approach such as a concern with individuals’ exclusion. To solve this, the
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already-broad conception of “institution” used may have to be expanded so it ends
up looking much like Pogge’s. Risse’s argument against Pogge is forceful enough
to conclude that harm and the baselines it requires may not be the best way to
think about human rights in the end, since the empirical tangles seem intractable.
Risse’s proposition that the global order has most likely done good allthings-considered reads somewhat like calling the glass a little bit full rather than
mostly empty. At first blush, this generates a concern that his argument will
engender complacency rather than call attention to the urgency and abhorrence of
the problem of poverty. He cites historical growth indicators meant to show that
the current state of the world contains less misery than any time in the past and
concludes: “Historically almost everybody was poor, but that is no longer true.”17
So far, this project has avoided all such statistics from a deep-rooted suspicion of
their reductive and manipulative potential.18 Each statistic Risse or Pogge uses
relies on economist’s notions of poverty, such as the now-infamous $1 a day
poverty line, per capita income, or purchasing power parity. I don’t want to argue
that these measures have no place in theory about poverty, but that their place
seems significantly less important than either author suggests. In any case, Risse’s
reliance on 200-year-old data to reject a historical baseline seems ridiculous
simply on concerns about fidelity. Colonial censuses may have claimed to be
accurate, but even today getting reliable measures of development indicators in
developing countries is extremely challenging, and I don’t see how we should
17

Risse, “Do we owe the global poor assistance or rectification?,” 10.
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place any significant weight in these measures. Extrapolations from more recent
trends seem equally suspicious.
If we maintain an appropriate open-mindedness about the good life, the
following claim is at least plausible: a subsistence farmer who can adequately
meet his or her family’s needs from work in his or her fields, almost entirely selfcontained has a perfectly fine life. Perhaps 200 years ago, almost everybody
engaged in this sort of lifestyle and was therefore “poor,” but the relatively recent
expansion of modern economic systems that threaten such a lifestyle has caused
objectionable poverty. I don’t intend to argue for the desirability of subsistence
farming here, but to show, as Amartya Sen has argued, that purely economic
indicators of well being, even when suitably broad, don’t form a reliable method
for judging what we ought to be really concerned with when assessing poverty
from a human rights perspective.19 To be fair, Risse does cite some more tangible
indicators such as life expectancy and infant mortality, but even these seem
inappropriately reductive. The disagreement between Risse and Pogge—they use
essentially the same numbers and manipulate in opposite directions to support
essentially opposed claims about the causation and evaluation of harm. This is not
to throw out empirical data entirely, but to suggest that even development
economists worry seriously about the usefulness and reliability of such data both
in determining causality and positive directions for policy, let alone theory—so
many competing factors (including significant allocations of funding) go into the
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production of the numbers that we must worry in a very serious way about their
reliability at all.20
Risse relies on such empirical evidence to motivate his argument against a
conception of global harm based on a historical benchmark for harm, where poor
countries are worse off than they once were. The bare outline of Risse’s claims is
almost obvious—of course people are generally wealthier now than they were 200
years ago, and perhaps that wealth is even distributed more evenly. However, this
evaluation relies on economical evaluations of well-being, and a human rights
outlook should look past the economical man, functioning based on income or
GDP or whatever else, and rely on broader metrics of well-being. An argument
for such an (admittedly somewhat far-fetched) view would require radical
commitments about the good life, such as an agrarian form of naturalism or a
Marxist conception of labor, that I’m not at all prepared to make here—but they
shouldn’t be thrown out as completely implausible in a broad view of human
rights.
Aside from dismissing the historical benchmark, Risse considers two other
benchmarks for harm that Pogge might adopt, counterfactual harm and
distributive fairness. In the former, we imagine an alternate society where the
Rich had never impacted the Poor. Risse points out not only that it is difficult to
know about such a situation, but also impossible—when we analyze a global
system, as we must to evaluate the alternative arrangements required by Pogge’s
20

Deaton, “Price Indexes, inequality, and the measurement of world poverty.” Deaton
points out a seriously troubling complexity in the PPP index. William Easterly is
extremely critical of poverty statistics and their manipulation by aid organizations who
get funding based on them at his blog, www.aidwatchers.com, particularly the recent
post: http://aidwatchers.com/2011/04/inception-statistics/

Grassroots Poverty and Grassroots Human Rights

25

model, there exist no systems similar to any counterfactual with which to compare
them. There’s only one globe, and we’re stuck inside it; methods of comparative
analysis don’t work without other systems to compare against. Any substantive
conclusions based upon counterfactual investigations of the sort employed by
comparative analysis will be impossible to generate for the whole globe.
Explanations of harm such as dependency theory, abandoned above, or
that past colonialism generated persistent harm, are then highly suspicious insofar
as they rely on counterfactual considerations of how things would have turned out
differently. But then Risse seems to overstep in making a similar assertion about
the cause for developed nations’ development: “The exploitation, theft and
murder they brought upon the world notwithstanding, developed countries
became rich because they industrialized, thereby benefiting from an ever more
refined division of labor.”21 This seems inconsistent at best—disagreement and
epistemic limitations make it practically impossible to settle why developing
countries are poor, but it’s clear that industrialization and specialization made rich
societies rich? As above, a human rights perspective precludes these economic
presuppositions. If we can’t reasonably know why developing countries are poor,
we also can’t know definitively why developed countries became rich. To
speculate wildly: what if the invasion of a practically pristine continent and the
subsequent genocide of millions of people allowed America to become as rich as
it is today, and the tendency of Western European societies to collapse and rebuild
in early history made that region rich, and the existence of relatively continuous
societies in South Asia and Africa causes poverty there, with ever-increasing
21
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population crowding and resource abuse? Why not, if there aren’t any good ways
to verify such claims or any others with counterfactuals or reliable and useful
empirical data? Risse shows that social scientists are deeply divided about what
causes prosperity and poverty. Where there might be agreement, it rests on the
presuppositions that human rights exists to cast out. These considerations incline
me to give up on the search for a baseline for harm, and search, as Risse does, for
a basis for human rights that generates duties independent of contentious
empirical study.
Before examining Risse’s grounding for human rights, it’s worth looking
at the suggestions he makes for duties of assistance instead of Pogge’s duties of
rectification, and what concerns the assumptions there raise. The ‘institutional
thesis’ is key and holds that the main cause for countries’ economic prosperity is
institutional quality, where institutions are the rules that define how a society
functions, “such as stable property rights, rule of law, bureaucratic capacity,
appropriate regulatory structures to curtail at least the worst forms of fraud, anticompetitive behavior, and graft, quality and independence of courts, but also
cohesiveness of society, existence of trust and social cooperation, and thus overall
quality of civil society.”22 Two competing economical theses provide the
counterarguments Risse combats: the ‘geography thesis’ holds that a broadly
construed notion of resource endowment accounts for the wealth of a nation,
while the ‘integration thesis’ has it that integration in world markets through trade
liberalization and the like determines economic well being.
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The clearest and most important empirical claim that Risse adduces
against (a caricature of) Pogge is that simple resource distribution—compensation
for an unjust order in the form official development assistance, resource dividend,
or whatever else—can hardly reduce poverty effectively. In order for resources to
make it into the hands of the poor, institutional complements such as banks must
exist; development projects need local institutional support to have effect that
endures past the fickle flow of international aid funding. Risse references the
amount of disagreement in development economics in this line of argument also,
relying on former World Bank economist William Easterly’s skepticism about
cure-alls for growth. Easterly concludes that a full basket of complementary
development measures are required to ensure lasting growth and that such a
nuanced project is much more difficult than economists through the latter half of
the twentieth century thought. Even that conclusion relies on the foundation that
economic growth leads to positive outcomes for the poor, which is in itself
controversial—we ought to note that despite the spectacular growth rates in South
Asia over the last two decades, an equally spectacular amount of poverty
persists.23 It should be obvious, as I have argued so far, that the empirical issues
here are wildly complex, but Risse presents the institutional thesis as the best
theory going and accepts it as such—if it were to be disproved, his entire
argument would collapse. It is broad enough to avoid the charge of being a
panacea in the vein that Easterly demolishes—institutions, so understood, require
broad reform that outside actors have limited agency to enact. The limits Risse
23
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places on outside involvement, and thusly the possibilities for positive duties
generated by human rights (even though human rights haven’t come into the
argument yet) depend on further assumptions about institutional change that may
need to be reconsidered.
The idea that institutional development is necessarily indigenous is crucial
to Risse’s argument, forming an additional “authenticity thesis,” nearly mentioned
above—the institutions that Risse is concerned with are of the sort that depend
crucially on domestic support. The rules of the social game don’t count for much
if no one wants to follow them. Risse grants that institutions’ emergence can be
influenced by outside agents, but their persistence requires domestic support. This
generates four constraints on institutional assistance that Risse presents: first, that
outside agents cannot be effective at nation-building; second, that any such effort
will be inherently paternalistic; third, no moral duty can exist to do something
that, according to the first, agents cannot execute well; fourth, that outside help in
institution building undermines the stability of those institutions.24 Risse may be
correct that assistance is better than rectification, along with many of Pogge’s
critics, but if his constraints on aid were suitably weakened, Pogge’s rectifying
measures might be able to conform to Risse’s system. First, it isn’t so clear that
outside actors will be totally ineffective in domestic institution-building, even
though this might be very difficult. Consider the success of externally stimulated
but locally-managed microfinance institutions in the developing world recently, or
models of women’s self-help groups that have proven quite effective in parts of
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northern India.25 These ideas were at once external and indigenous, suggesting
that the line required for the authenticity thesis isn’t so sharp as Risse suggests.
Outsider money might provide salaries for indigenous, local organizers who help
educate and advise the indigenous poor to agitate for beneficial institutions and
organize against the existent unjust local institutions. There seem to be ways to
channel such resources that aren’t so paternalistic as to be objectionable. This
funding is inherently unstable, but the point is for the development workers to
work themselves out of a job, building self-sustaining institutional frameworks
that eventually won’t require outside funding. This sketch of a rights-based
development model is new and relatively untested itself, but it should show that
the constraints aren’t necessarily so strict as Risse makes them out to be. Aside
from the potential implausibility of Risse’s strict constraints on institutional
change, a further and related concern is that Risse’s focus on long-term solutions
misses the urgency of poverty that Pogge emphasizes.
Rory Finnin argues that Risse’s approach disguises a potential for disaster.
He construes Pogge’s dismaying picture of severe poverty as analogous to a fire
raging in a building with victims trapped inside. Resources are available to put the
fire out, but standers-by do not know what caused the fire and accordingly what
measures would best put it out. As a result, the standers-by decide to build
institutional capacity for the putting out of fires, and the victims burn to death
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while they deliberate. This paints a dilemma: if the institutional thesis is right,
institutional capacity building as a prescription offers the most value in
development aid, while stop-gap resource transfers won’t do much, although they
will have some effect. If it’s wrong, though, institutional capacity building will
allow poverty to persist while the international community deliberates on how
institutions ought to look, and short-term resource transfer and other lesssustainable measures will be more successful than was thought.26
Finnin suggests a matrix thesis accounting for a wide diversity of factors
in the cause of poverty, any of which may present itself more strongly in one
society or another depending on local expressions of those factors. This is
analogous to my suggestion that we interpret the institutional thesis broadly—
“matrix thesis” might then be a more appropriate term. What is important, though,
is that some help needs to be done even though the best help isn’t entirely clear.
Finnin suggests that Pogge’s approach, focusing on the immediacy of poverty
deaths, suggests a proper course of action in providing for immediate rectification
(which ends up looking very much like normal positive duties of assistance)
coupled with long-term global institutional changes that will make the
international system more amenable to strong local institutions. The institutional
thesis is no more determinate than any other empiric “explanation” for poverty,
and its adoption can lead to morally distasteful lacunas in prescriptions for action.
Finnin captures the urgency of poverty and, if his paper wasn’t constrained to the
Risse-Pogge debate, his line of argument ought to simply yield positive duties of
assistance based on the considerations of urgency and moral hazard he draws.
26
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Pogge explicitly sets out to get around such standard arguments for positive duties
of assistance, but the urgency of poverty is a strong motivation to reconsider a
slow-burn approach to alleviating it.
Two conclusions suggest themselves so far—Pogge hasn’t really given
strong enough empirical arguments for a baseline of harm that can justify tangible
results from his libertarian approach to human rights, and Risse has shown that
this empirical work might be impossible. Risse hasn’t really given an argument
that excludes Pogge’s, though, if we take the institutional thesis to be sufficiently
broad and recognize that Pogge’s rectifying prescriptions can include both
stopgap lifesaving measures and long-term sustainable institutional capacity
building. While I find Pogge’s redistributive measures unsatisfying in their
implausibility, it is conceivable that the funds from a resource dividend would be
directed toward the sort of institutional support—training teachers, funding
community activists, etc.—that Risse seems to suggest.
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4. Common ownership and associative human rights
Development economics and the empirical concerns with their intersection
with human rights as considered above yield a great temptation for cynicism
about the whole project, but there may still be ways to ground a human rights
theory that yield results for the poor. What does a theory of human rights needs to
look like in order to truly serve as the 21st century “language of emancipation,” as
Risse puts it? How may human rights replace now-defunct idioms of Marxism,
dependency theory, and theological systems as a language to empower the poor?27
Risse proposes a schema for human rights conceptions, concludes that a
philosophically best account of human rights probably doesn’t exist, and grounds
his conception in common ownership of the Earth to yield an assignment of
positive duties based on associative rights shared by all common owners. He
stretches his conception slightly to include the right to work as a human right,
which provided an opportunity for Pogge to lambaste the idea that human rights
can be properly construed as membership rights at all. Risse’s evaluative system
for human rights is useful as an analytic tool, and provides motivation for an
argument that membership might be misleading in light of potentially enduring
concerns about the nature of the global association in which membership is
meaningful.
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For Risse, a conception of human rights has four components: a list of
rights, a basis for why people have the rights on that list, a principle that generates
the list, and an assignment of duties to fulfill the list of rights.28 He never gives an
explicit argument for this schema. However, it provides a useful instrument to get
the array of human rights conceptions on the table straight, and allows Risse to
conclude that the theoretical options will probably not yield a singular best
account. Human rights conceptions break up into basis-driven, principle-driven,
list-driven, or (perhaps) responsibility-driven depending on which part of the
schema they take as a starting point. Risse runs through a number of conceptions
with this in mind—Beitz’s practical conception is list-driven because it takes
human rights practice as prime and goes from there, Cohen’s is basis-driven since
it begins with membership in an acceptable domestic political society, and Risse’s
is basis-driven resting on common-owner membership.29 Under this schema, it
seems that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach would be principle-driven in that it
takes the principle of human capability as prime.30 Sen’s construal of human
rights as elements of global public reason would also be principle-driven because,
if nothing else, he explicitly refuses to formulate a list or endorse a basis.31
Pogge’s conception seems to be principle-driven, if we think of his reading of
article 28 as a principle determining how the list functions. Risse concludes from
his classification and the clear differences between different types of conceptions
that no singular conception will be able to answer all of the relevant philosophical
28
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questions about human rights in a satisfactory way—we cannot hope for a best
philosophical account. Basis-driven conceptions resting on human agency will
usually deliver a revisionist list, like Griffin’s, and then impose rather strong
responsibilities correlating to the relatively strong and short list. List-driven
conceptions will tend to have longer lists and weaker responsibilities, and
succumb to objections in the vein of O’Neill’s work mentioned above.
Pogge objects in his comment that an application of Rawlsian deliberative
equilibrium to this dialectical situation could allow us to come up with the
strongest points of each conception to synthesize a best answer to each question
demanded of human rights. It seems to me that Risse has drawn distinctions
between the conceptions he sketches that will force them to be in some way
mutually exclusive—for example, a substantive minimalist viewpoint about the
content of human rights cannot possibly countenance the expansive viewpoint of
a practical conception since the very point of minimalist approaches such as
Griffin’s seems to be revision of the practice. A justificatory minimalist, such as
Cohen, will be forced to reject the positive duties generated by the heavyweight
basis employed by substantive minimalists—it may be impossible to resolve these
conflicts in the end. That said, there is some room for selective synthesis of
human rights conceptions, as I will propose below, and the insight that different
conceptual approaches serve different ends is a valuable one. Risse’s stipulated
end is to deliver an explicitly non-parochial conception of human rights that may
deliver positive duties of assistance that are very limited as per his commitment to
the institutional thesis. I find these restrictions informative, and yet somewhat too
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strict, and the contingent, non-parochial basis Risse offers is unlikely to meet the
requirement that human rights radically end the exclusion of the poor from the
institutions that Risse argues are necessary to support the fulfillment of human
rights.
In developing his conception, Risse makes three main moves. First, he
resuscitates a 17th-century idea popularized by Grotius in “On the Law of War and
Peace” that political community should be founded on the basis of common
ownership of the Earth. Then he counts on a view of the global order, defined by
the system of states that now govern all of the relevant parts of Earth’s territory
and the international institutions that regulate the interactions of those states. In
virtue of living on the Earth that Risse posits is completely ruled by this global
order combining states with international rules of the game, each person who
owns the Earth in common is a member in this order. Then he conceives of human
rights, including the standard requirements of universality, urgency, and a
political nature, as essentially associative membership rights in that global order.
The obligations generated by these human rights depend on that membership, as
obligations of assistance might hold in any political association.
Resurrecting the idea of common ownership has a fairly disagreeable and
radical connotation since it has been left mostly alone for about 300 years. An
obvious, somewhat superficial objection here is that common ownership itself is
just too weird to ground human rights, and I’ll reserve judgment on those grounds
until Risse publishes his book on the topic. Risse meets skepticism about the
weirdness of his basis by asserting that the ownership in question is directly
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related to the basic resource-goods that make human life possible, and this makes
it amenable on its face to human rights perspectives.32 In very rough outline,
common ownership gets off the ground on the intuitive ideas that basic resources
are necessary to human life and aren’t earned by anyone, so everyone has some
claim their ownership in a pre-institutional state of nature. This evenly distributed
claim generates natural rights including basic liberty rights and a “protective
perimeter” of subsistence rights, only guaranteeing those goods that can be
afforded by the commonly owned original resources.33 The modern state of affairs
is obviously not a state of nature though; specifically, the imposition of a statebased system causes both conventions that restrict individual natural claims to
resources through restriction of movement and property conventions and generate
group (i.e. national or perhaps corporate) entitlements to the exclusive use of
resources. This has the effect of subjecting people to the "ex ante risks and ex post
reality of finding themselves in conditions where their moral status as co-owners
can be exercised at most in rudimentary ways if at all; and it allows them only
limited exit options (if any) if they find themselves with an abusive
government."34 This imposition generates human rights as claims against the
global institutional order that are inherently associational and partially derive
from Grotean natural rights to common ownership.
Risse’s conception of membership here is thinner than that generally used
when considering membership in a club or domestic society:
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“Being a member of that order means to live on the territory covered by it
and to be subject to those bits of this interlocking system of jurisdictions
that apply to one’s own situation. By now all human beings are members
in this sense because they all live on the territory of some state.”35
This fact is contingent, but since the state order is “relatively abiding,”
Risse claims that human rights as associational rights will be sufficient to
guarantee basic access to subsistence. The rights Risse can deliver with this
requirement seem at first to be very minimalist, by reading the requirements on
states “robustly” he can generate a broader set of human rights that limit state
power against individuals. This part of the argument is rather unclear, but it seems
that he means that the lopsided amount of power states hold against individuals
needs to be checked with a broad set of rights to fully guarantee subsistence. Then
Risse can get civil and political rights, as instrumental to guaranteeing basic
access to goods and determining which states get to restrict access to their group
claims on resources with closed borders. Importantly, even this robust reading
doesn’t deliver some of the more expansive rights on the UDHR, such as leisure
or guaranteed work, since these cannot be viewed properly as checks on state
power. Risse doesn’t present his derivation of human rights as exclusive,
however, allowing that some other grounds may be acceptable as well to
generating broader human rights than what his basis generates. It isn’t stated
particularly clearly, but the responsibilities in this conception fall primarily on
states to guarantee basic access to subsistence, and derivatively on the
international order to help when states cannot do so (presumably, in light of the
institutional thesis above, restricted to institutional capacity-building.)
35
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I don’t wish to enter a debate on the acceptability of common ownership
as a basis for human rights, but there are a few clear fault lines in Risse’s
derivation that are worth mentioning. Firstly, and of only superficial importance,
there is an intuitive contradiction in claiming that a human rights conception
based on common ownership of the Earth will be essentially non-parochial:
common ownership of the Earth in itself is a potentially parochial position, aside
from being an relatively heavyweight commitment to natural rights, however
compelling Risse’s arguments to the contrary are. Risse makes the rather
confusing claim that thinking of human rights “in virtue of being grounded on
features of an empirically contingent but relatively abiding world order, differ
from pre-institutional moral rights and from rights that hold only within that
association with which we are most familiar, the state,” solves the problem of
parochialism, but this isn’t even really clear.36 The problem is that the rights
crucially rely on the idea of common ownership, even given the supposed
attractiveness of their reliance on a contingent global order.
The second concern is Risse’s characterization of human rights as
membership rights, and this seems to be the step in his movement from natural
rights (if we can accept Grotean natural rights) to human rights. Pogge raises the
point in his comment on Risse’s essay on labor rights that he sees no good reason
for Risse to abandon the standard interpretation of human rights as non-contingent
and universal in favor of human rights as associative rights. He also worries that
Risse’s conception allows certain rights unrelated to basic needs to be left out as
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not urgent enough global concerns, torture being the prime example.37 The first of
Pogge’s objections is unfair—Risse explicitly allows that other conceptions can
fill in rights not captured by his system of derivation. The “robust” reading of his
requirements above may deliver rights such as freedom from torture as global
concerns based on enlightened self-interest, perhaps, but Risse isn’t completely
clear about this and I share Pogge’s skepticism that such requirements will be
sufficient to generate the required set of human rights. Similar empirical
arguments to those required for Pogge’s conception to deliver would be required
for such a move, and Risse himself showed that those will be very tough to come
by.
Pogge worries very much in his response that Risse’s conception of
human rights as membership is needlessly a reactionary move against 60 years of
human rights discourse that hold that human rights are essentially held by every
human. The reactionary nature of the account doesn’t worry me much, and on my
reading Pogge’s account is somewhat reactionary as well—but there is a very
serious concern about Risse’s characterization of human rights as membership
rights. Risse uses the empirical contingency that all individuals live on territory
controlled by states as a crucial bridge from natural rights held by all humans in
virtue of living on the Earth to arrive at associative human rights held against the
global order. There are two problems here: first, even if individuals are members
in the thin sense of membership, the practice of the global order as we see it—and
can expect to see it for the foreseeable future—fails to accord any substantive
37
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benefits on the grounds of thin membership. Secondly, the territorial coverage of
the state system that Risse takes for granted may in fact be less homogenous than
maps indicate, and the holes inherent in this coverage will exclude many of the
people who need the security his conception of human rights delivers. I’ve hinted
earlier that the global order isn’t as relevant to those concerned with human rights
as it is to philosophers theorizing about them—although I don’t have a field study
to properly back this up. If this is the case, Risse can still succeed if humans are
members of states constitutive of the global order in the sense that Risse relies on,
but states routinely ignore this membership with impunity. For that matter, the
international community does the same—interests far divorced from human
rights, such as economic and strategic interests that India and China have in
Burma, effectively stymie intervention in that grossly human rights violating
state. This exclusion can happen in two ways in the domestic case. First, an
obviously deviant state could exclude a large portion of its population from the
benefits of statehood—these people may be members of the state in virtue of
living on its territory, but they are essentially excluded in the state system. Risse
might point out that these excluded groups are still members of the global order
and that international intervention on their behalf is justified because the state is
not meeting its human rights obligations. However, geopolitical considerations
like those just mentioned will preclude intervention on their behalf, contingently
and abidingly. Their membership in the global order means very little in practical
terms.
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My argument for the second sense of exclusion based the heterogeneity of
the supposedly continuous state system provides the basis for my concern here,
but I cannot provide more than a conceptual account of a rather empirical insight.
Hopefully a hand-waving example will suffice to show that the objection is a
plausible description of how the state order differs from Risse’s idealized
conception.
Even in well-ordered states, many members may of practical necessity
lack access to that state. A layman’s understanding of the current state of affairs
in India provides an excellent example of this phenomenon, although it can be
extended to remote parts of most states. Just short of a civil war is raging in the
largest democracy on Earth, and a ludicrous amount of that country is almost
completely out of government control. “The Red Corridor,” as it’s called, covers
almost a third of the eastern part of the country, and is at least heavily influenced,
if not completely under the control of, “Naxalite” rebels.38 We almost never hear
about this quiet disaster in the West, and to discuss this situation in more than
bare outline is another project entirely. According to one line of explanation
among many, the Naxalite-controlled areas were never really under any influence
by the Indian government. These parts of the country are both very remote and
traditionally excluded based on social grounds—tribal people lie outside the caste
system entirely. The people in these jungles have traditionally been extremely
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poor on any thoughtful definition, and in most cases still are—if the state has
never made any real effort to include them as members, and armed revolution has
ensued as a result, what have membership-based human rights done for them?
Risse argues that tribal people may still have his version of human rights, but that
“in the case of such tribes there presumably are unusually strong reasons to set
aside enforcement of human rights.”39 This very strong reason not to intervene
seems completely counterintuitive—in many cases, those in question are precisely
the ones in need of the sorts of protections that Risse prescribes. For instance,
people in such a hole of state control might find themselves threatened when
mineral reserves are discovered on their land, and require some protection of
basic needs as their previously almost natural existence is impinged upon. It is
conceivable that the case is similar for many other rural peoples the world over,
and that membership-based human rights will essentially exclude them as a
byproduct of the reliance on state control as a bridge from natural rights to human
rights. This result is clearly unacceptable, and gives a strong reason to be
skeptical of the efficacy of Risse’s approach.
Another example might help illuminate the point. To stretch an analogy
used in completely different contexts, the modern state system may look like
American cheese on the surface, but actually admits areas where the coverage of
state control looks more like Swiss cheese.40 In the holes, state power hardly
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reaches at all, either due to territorial difficulties States have serious territorial
holes, even though they may not show up on the map. These are shrinking with
technological advances, but it’s possible to think that even states that nominally
respect human rights will continue to be holey for the predictable future. Some of
the peoples who live in the holes will have no interest in human rights and be
living a perfectly decent life, but some of them will necessarily suffer
deprivations and dangers from the pressures of modern economic life without
having reliable access to any of the guarantees that a state-membership based
human rights offers them.
Jon Mandle offers another crucial situation that may repudiate Risse’s
version of human rights as membership rights:
A particular region in this society is populated by an ethnic minority, and
in that territory private death squads target the minority and operate with
impunity. The government could take action to crack down on the terror
squads, but the majority believes that since they are largely confined to a
particular region, doing so is not a priority. It is not that the majority
actively supports the death squads. The latter simply do not register as a
major concern for most people, and the government reflects this
indifference.41
In this case, the territory isn’t necessarily out of government control—it is
simply out of government concern. Even if the poor are nominally included in the
association, the powerful members of the association are in no way barred from
disregarding them; thin membership doesn’t necessarily count for much. This is
obviously morally wrong, but and a situation human rights ought to work to
many rulers of that country have left the difficult regions mostly alone, with only passing
and peripheral assertions of state power. Is this how we want a human rights regime to
look, though, allowing the often-remote and difficult to “control” poor to their own
devices? It seems contradictory to the very idea of universal human rights.
41
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counteract—but if membership provides the basis for human rights, there is an
intuitive limit on the human rights of those who don’t have membership. The
international system is just as guilty as domestic societies in ignoring some
members—the only groups that get the protections that they require are those who
understand how to work media and, in many ways, get lucky. To make
membership-grounded human rights amenable to human rights’ function in
ending exclusion requires a fairly revionist understanding of the idea of
membership, which Risse understandably offers. It may be more sensible and
theoretically intuitive to avoid invoking convoluted and thin ideas of membership
so that we don’t miss the importance of ending exclusion with a practice of
human rights.42
I find this concern disastrous to Risse’s painting of human rights as
essentially associative, even if his account of natural rights is compelling. While
acknowledging that the middle move in his derivation probably won’t work, there
are some valuable insights that we ought to hang on to moving forward. First,
Risse’s assignment of duties properly locates states as the primary morally
responsible agents in guaranteeing access to subsistence. That states must
compensate for the effects of their imposition on common-owners access to basic
resources drifts closer to Pogge’s conception than is completely obvious in that it
looks suspiciously like a duty of rectification for the imposition of unjust
institutions. Risse doesn’t take the restrictions imposed by states as unjust,
however, so the obligations necessarily won’t be termed as rectification for harm.
42
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Risse generates the sort of positive duties I want to end up with—on the
international community to assist local institutional capacity building and on
states to ensure guarantees to the needs stipulated by human rights. He does this
on a potentially objectionable conception of membership, however, and this
intermediary step in his argument runs the risk of perpetuating exclusion and
therefore missing a key strength and focus of human rights discourse. He also
falls short of giving an argument for duties to ensure a few things we want to
preserve as human rights, such as a right to be free from torture and seems to
preclude the sort of stop-gap short term duties of assistance that may be necessary
in urgent situations of extreme poverty. I will close the theoretical discussion of
human rights with a sketch of how a capabilities approach in the vein of
Nussbaum’s Aristotlean approach to distributive justice may allow a less
problematic intermediate step from naturalistic entitlements to human rights. The
line of argument looks very similar to Risse’s and delivers very similar results,
but engenders its own set of objections, mostly focusing on standard worries
about parochialism that we may simply have to swallow in order to deliver the
positive upshot of a human rights that can reliably concern itself with combating
poverty.
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5. Capabilities as a principle and end: a return to orthodoxy
The idea of capabilities is not at all new, and sadly isn’t uncontroversial as
it seems, although it has become common currency in development discourse
largely due to the work of Amartya Sen and Marhta Nussbaum in the 1980’s and
early 1990’s. Capabilities shift a focus on resources in the Rawlsian, or Poggean,
or Rissean, systems of global justice that ask essentially, “what does a person
have to to the question, “what is [a person] actually able to do and be?”43A narrow
focus on resources, Sen and Nussbaum argue, misses the fact that some persons,
due to structural (which are going to be primary human rights concerns) or
personal (still important, but more contentious to deal with using human rights)
factors, won’t be able to make equal use of an equal resource basket. The
centrality of capabilities to proper development indicators turns on their ability to
evaluate well-being in this sense, as I hinted at above in the discussion of the
empirical issues between Pogge and Risse and how they both rely on potentially
contestable development and poverty indicators such as income or per capita GDP
or even Purchasing Power Parity. Actually defining ways to measure capabilities
understood gets tricky, but Sen and other economists at the UN have developed
indices that combine a variety of data to assess well-being as such.44 As an
objective measure that focuses on people instead of potentially homogenizing and
malleable numbers, the capability approach has proven to be extremely useful in
the identification of human development issues and the design and evaluation of
aid projects. Instead of focusing on human functionings—what people actually do
43
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and are—the capabilities focus on the possibility of having those functionings
given social context, personal potential, and access to resources. Even if someone
has a right to food, they can choose to forgo it for a fast; a right to play may be
forfeited to pursue a life or arduous study (or writing a capstone!) Sen makes this
clearer with his distinction between opportunity and process aspects of freedom—
capabilities address opportunity, but not process, where process is understood as
the substantive realization of some freedom.45
Nussbaum, when considering the intersection of capabilities and human
rights, splits up capabilities into three types: basic, understood as a simple
potentiality to exercise some action; internal, understood as a personal state that
includes sufficient conditions to exercise a function; and combined, where the
internal capability meets with external conditions that allow the exercise of some
function. “The aim of public policy is the production of combined capabilities.”46
Under the perspective I’m advocating that human rights should focus on tangible
outcomes, we can add that combined capabilities are also the aim of human rights.
She goes on to sketch out a list of ten capabilities that she takes as both valuable
in themselves and instrumental to making a life fully human: life, bodily health,
bodily integrity, the ability to engage sense, imagination, and thought, the ability
to exercise emotions, practical reason, affiliations, living with other species, play,
and control over one’s environment. These constitute the basic combined
capabilities that will be candidates for human rights. Nussbaum then describes
how human rights intersect with capabilities, in that the securement of a human
45
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right should guarantee the capability, broadly construed, to enjoy the good of the
human right. One of the most simple upshots of this is an intuitive unification of
civil-political rights and socio-economic rights: "all capabilities have an economic
aspect: even the freedom of speech requires education, adequate nutrition, etc.”47
Capabilities, moreover, allow a basis for the important aspect of human rights that
preferentially distributes attention to the excluded and marginalized. Similar to
Risse’s entitlements to originally owned goods, capabilities also place social and
economic rights at a preferred position—the capability to have adequate
subsistence seems prior to all the other capabilities on the list. In gesturing at why
capabilities don’t completely make rights obsolete, Nussbaum gives four reasons
why rights are still important even with capabilities: they emphasize justified and
urgent claims to some basic capability, add urgency and linguistic weight to
whatever capability list is accepted, lend a connotation of choice and autonomy,
and, most importantly, provide a terrain of agreement for a capability list.
Sen differs from Nussbaum in his argument for the intersection of
capabilities and human rights mainly in his refusal to specify a capability list,
accompanied by somewhat vague assertions about what a list of human rights
might look like. He gives two main reasons for this, both of which I find
unsatisfactory: he doesn’t see how an overarching list of capabilities can be
sensitive to local contexts, and doesn’t want to short-circuit public reason by
asserting a theoretical list. “The problem is not with listing important capabilities,
but with insisting on one pre-determined canonical list of capabilities, chosen by
theorists without any general social discussion or public reasoning. To have such
47
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a fixed list, emanating entirely from pure theory, is to deny the possibility of
fruitful public participation on what should be included and why.”48 Nussbaum
doesn’t seem to take her list as so fixed, and there’s no reason to think that a
public discourse can’t modify a list that a humble philosopher suggests. Sen goes
on to assert that particular lists of capabilities are relevant to certain uses, and so
they cannot be coincident with human rights that he takes as somehow unified in
justification and necessarily fixed across circumstances.49 I have argued above
that a conception of human rights might need to be flexible in exactly the way Sen
paints capabilities as flexible—differently justified for different evaluative and
normative purposes. If capabilities provide some foundation for human rights,
then the conception of human rights that they generate could be similarly flexible
in serving different normative purposes. This fact doesn’t on its own preclude
broad agreement on a set of human rights derived from the principle of a
capabilities set, but could allow for a robust and variable justification for human
rights. While remaining mum on a list of capabilities and a list of human rights,
essentially leaving the project to public reason, Sen’s theory of human rights may
become a “lame contention” that agents merely have a responsibility to consider
doing something about human rights, to use Pogge’s rather polemical words.
Then agents have done their duty when they think about a human rights violation
and decide not to do anything about it—this on its face lacks the basic force that
human rights ought to have.50 Nussbaum offers slightly more substantial hints—
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emphasizing ‘slightly’ to acknowledge that her arguments are widely considered
overly vague and potentially quite contentious—at how the capabilities approach
can fill out a conception of human rights.
We might evaluate Nussbaum’s system on the four components of a
human rights conception suggested by Risse and discussed above. She presents a
list of capabilities—these will serve as a principle to generate a list of human
rights, in a sort of backwards way, beginning with a list of outcomes that list
ought to produce rather than a procedure for generating the list. Her basis,
coincidentally, relies in some degree on Grotius’ “On the Law of War and Peace”
from which Risse derives common ownership, although the idea she extracts from
it could be attributed to any number of political philosophers. Nussbaum shifts the
focus in Grotius from ownership of the Earth to a perceived innate human desire
or necessity to live in a community that secures human dignity for all.
This concept of human dignity, also perhaps termed as what it is to live a
fully human life, is enumerated in terms of limits and capacities constituting what
she’s (perhaps inappropriately) termed an Aristotlean approach, including ten
basic features of humans that provide a sort of basis for the list of capabilities
itself: mortality, the body as universal and bodily needs as a result (including
sexual desire!), cognitive capability, early development, practical reason,
affiliation, relatedness with other species, play, separateness, and strong
separateness.51 I don’t want to delve into the contentiousness of these principles
of what it is to be human, but there is some deep concern raised by Bobonich in
51
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his response to Nussbaum’s argument about their justification. Nussbaum and Sen
present the idea that moralities and mythologies might yield such a set of
principles in some form of overlapping consensus, but this step seems extraneous
to me, even if it isn’t likely to yield a sufficiently compelling account of
humanness.52 Beitz raises a series of very serious worries about the groundings
for Nussbaum’s system and any naturalistic theory, and I admit that his objections
are compelling and that Beitz’s practical conception of human rights is difficult to
disagree with.53 Even so, I remain confident that there will be a way to solve these
difficulties, or simply acknowledge them and maintain that a naturalistic account
does the best job of justifying the sort of positive duties that we’ve seen may be
most effective given the arguments above. In a deep way, this approach is
philosophically unsatisfying, but there are a few reasons, loosely related to
Richard Rorty’s sentimentalist view that most writers make a point to mention
and deride, that give us some justification to be somewhat unsatisfied in the
interest of maintaining an intuitive view of human rights that has some prospect
of justifying institutional duties of assistance to the poor.
The roughly Aristotlean (or, should we say, Nussbaumian?) approach
yields positive duties in much the same way that orthodox theories of human
rights do, and yet Nussbaum sketches an argument for mitigating the standard
objections to those duties through institutionalization. Once a set of universal
essential human traits are identified, this generates a moral demand equally upon
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every individual to help provide for every other individual’s realization of a set of
capabilities generated by the essential human characteristics agreed upon. I hardly
need to rehearse the issues generated by this fairly standard move of individual
universal obligations—the most important problem is that it seems impossible
under such a scheme to properly aggregate individual duties in order to make
sense of the responsibilities of redistribution.54
In later work, Nussbaum sketches how such an argument might go, and
this allocation of responsibility seems remarkably amenable to the concerns of
Risse and Pogge above. It could avoid the intermediary fault lines in their
arguments, and if we can trust in a solution to the foundational worries about the
approach, this version of duties of assistance has the potential to generate real
change in the actualization of human rights focused aid. As a first step, each
individual acting to discharge her responsibility toward ensuring capabilities
would obviously generate massive confusion. It then makes sense for individuals
to delegate their individual responsibilities of assistance to institutions of which
they are aggregate parts. A concern of fairness also plays into this
institutionalization of individual naturalistic responsibilities, since morally aware
individuals will end up contributing more assistance than moral ignoramuses. If
the responsibilities are aggregated into institutional responsibilities, this evens
out. As a final move, if an obligation to promote capabilities devoured the lives of
those on whom the obligation falls, the whole approach would lose its grip on
what it is to be human, since the wealthy would then be denied their own
54
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capabilities in ensuring the capabilities of the poor. With these instrumental
concerns about the allocation and discharge of duties of assistance, Nussbaum
more or less stipulates that institutions should take on a responsibility to promote
capabilities and therefore human rights that is aggregated from a naturally
individual array of responsibilities. This is in concord with either Pogge’s or
Risse’s system, and while the argument that Nussbaum gives is rather general, I
see no reason why it isn’t a compelling grounds for further specification of how
states and the international community ought to discharge those aggregate
responsibilities.55 The domestic case is simple, Nussbaum states—constitutional
institutions are responsible for guaranteeing the capabilities sets of a state’s
citizens. She prescribes a list of ten principles for the global order that ought to
discharge these collective responsibilities at the international level, without really
arguing for them. I see no reason to object to the principles, and some are
particularly insightful—the international order ought to focus on education as
primarily responsible for the fulfillment of all capabilities per Rorty’s prescription
to raise sentiments.
The upshot of this argument for Nussbaum is that her list of basic
capabilities are proposed as purely instrumental requirements on the structure of
constitutions. As long as the capability list is agreeable enough—through some
consensus process, presumably, the list is seen as a guide for domestic policy. We
can see this as a human rights requirement as well—if the list is informed or
informs international human rights as Nussbaum seems to argue, the capabilities
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list so conceived acts as a guide on domestic political structures to respect human
rights and concurrently holds states as the chief guarantors of human rights.
Polly Vizards’ “Poverty and Human Rights” outlines Amartya Sen’s
contributions to this project, and is worth mentioning for how she sees how a
capabilities outlook can inform a “working model” of human rights much in the
vein of a rights-based approach that is has been recently adopted by the UN and a
number of prominent transnational NGOs.56 She points out that neither Nussbaum
nor Sen ever offers a sufficiently specific distribution of duties of assistance in
their ethical systems, and so a capabilities perspective needs some further
argument to tack this down. Vizard, in the end, suggests that the international
human rights framework as it is goes a long way to provide that supplemental
specification of duties, and I find this proposal compelling—Vizard essentially
combines Nussbaum’s idea of capabilities with an inherently practical (she uses
“pragmatic”) conception of human rights. The list of human rights in treaties and
practice gives a basis on which we can derive some agreement about the basic
characteristics of human dignity or human functioning without such a
metaphysically heavyweight commitment as the roughly Aristotlean program.
These capabilities still play the same role in generating collective positive duties
of assistance and a similar argument for their institutionalization applies.57
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Vizard’s proposal has the potential to diffuse objections about the
Aristotlean commitment that Nussbaum makes to specifying the essential features
of human life. Without exploring this route further, it’s worth taking the
intersection of Nussbaum’s concerns about pity and Aristotleanism and Rorty’s
sentimentalist position seriously. In his “Human Rights, Rationality, and
Sentimentality,” Rorty makes the claim that human rights are essentially a product
of increased sentiment in the wake of the Second World War, and asking
questions about their ontology or further justification is more or less silly.58 This
obviously gives cause for most philosophers writing books about that very
justification to throw out Rorty’s argument or merely mention it in passing, but
there is some value to the insight. Nussbaum suggests that without some
conception of shared humanity—seemingly the very definition of
sentimentality—grounded in commitments on what it takes to be fully human,
pity isn’t possible.59 Given the clear difficulties and diversity of approaches to
justifying human rights, and Risse’s conjecture that a singular best philosophical
account may be impossible, it’s worth taking these concurrent claims seriously.
There is at least some truth to the claim that human rights rely on shared
sentiment, and the claim that the advance of support for whatever they demand—
institutional change, redistributive measures, domestic legislation ensuring some
egalitarian access to services and goods—will necessarily depend on increased
educational capacity. If we take Nussbaum’s point seriously as well, that this
sentiment depends on some agreement on what it is to be human and that the
58
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recognition of these features will disallow a rational agent from discounting the
humanity of even distant others upon appropriate reflection, we suddenly have a
compelling argument for a commitment to some idea of basic human
characteristics derived from a recognition of the value of human rights. If this
argument is coherent—stepping from human rights to sentimentality to some
vaguely Aristotlean argument about flourishing to a good reason to accept such a
commitment—we may have a reason to “point out that all justification ends
somewhere” and more satisfying accounts of a flourishing basis for human rights
aren’t necessary. Bobonich describes this response as arbitrary and forecloses the
hopes of widespread agreement on the basis for human rights or distributive
justice. The latter point may just be the case, but I’ll suggest (controversially, and
I admittedly cannot give a deep argument for this) that a suitably basic account of
human capabilities doesn’t have to be so agreeable across cultures as long as it is
conceivably demandable by those who want the capabilities implied.
I don’t want to suggest that Rorty’s argument is the end of the game with
human rights and we should simply focus on education to achieve a progressive
acceptance of human rights norms. There is some value to giving moral
arguments for the basis of redistributive duties, and grounding states’ obligations
to citizens in capabilities-grounded human rights language gives an extremely
useful guide for development policy. Without engaging the wide range of
arguments against Nussbaum’s commitment to some conception of what it is to be
human, I submit that there is plausibly some way to justify such a list, whether it
be through some broad consensus, pragmatic interpretation of existing human
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rights law, or other commitments to the instrumental role of common humanity in
the sentimentality necessary to any actualization of human rights. The imposition
of collective responsibilities generated by this sort of human rights conception can
plausibly conform to the pragmatic suggestions of both Risse and Pogge while
maintaining a focus on the real experience—the attainment of capabilities—of
those the duties exist to protect. I see several ways in which this approach can
actualize international duties of assistance informed by the discussion of Risse
above. International actors, represented by aggregative institutions such as states,
corporations, and global governance bodies, will have a duty to support poor
countries in their efforts to juridify and implement schemes that help realize
human rights in ways that expand the capabilities of the poor. The exercise of this
duty can take a number of forms. Official development assistance can be spent on
civil society NGOs that play an instrumental role in connecting the grassroots
with such development initiatives. Domestically, rich states must focus on
capacity building in education to raise sentimentality in rich citizens as Rorty
suggests, so that those citizens will be more inclined to accept progressive change
of the international and state order. Perhaps through such a process we can have
hope for Pogge’s suggested reforms. There is also a human rights generated
responsibility for rich states to realize policies domestically that can serve as
examples for poor states—this somewhat convoluted path to realize institutional
duties of assistance is also crucial for developing a discourse on how to integrate
human rights/capabilities into constitutional structures the world over.
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I’ve argued that at least two approaches to fighting poverty with human
rights, Pogge’s institutional account and Risse’s common-owner membership
account, distort valuable aims of human rights practice and are crucially open to
severe empirical concerns in the chain of argument from theory to tangible
outcomes. Some more orthodox, naturalistic account of human rights may have
the potential to get from a commitment to come account of human flourishing in
the vein of Nussbaum’s list to tangible outcomes with an argument from
collective responsibilities. This account avoids concerns about a basis in
membership by instead basing human rights in commitments to facts about the
human person or the nature of sentimentality and human rights. Either of these
bases may be contested, but I submit that such an admittedly traditional account
of human rights will be the best way to justify the sort of assistance that will best
benefit the poor. I do not intend for this account to be exclusive—Pogge gives an
extremely compelling system for motivating global institutional reform, and
Risse’s system offers powerful reasons to ground human rights-based assistance
in institutional capacity building. Other conceptions of human rights may best
justify military intervention, or serve other aims commonly required of human
rights. I intended to come up with a justification for a human rights based
approach to poverty and development, however, and I ultimately must return to an
old-fashioned, somewhat unsophisticated commitment to the human person and
capabilities to deliver a rich basis for fighting poverty based on human rights. The
final section will discuss in broad outline a particular such institutional scheme in
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India to suggest how a state and the international community can actualize such
an account.
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6. NREGA: toward rights-based development
In 2005, the government of India passed the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA.) It has become the largest social welfare scheme in the
world, costing around $30 billion since its inception, and even though it has
serious difficulties in nationwide implementation, the Act has become a crucial
asset for the rural poor.60 I’ll begin with an outline of the complicated guidelines
in the Act while avoiding much of the contention about how it is being
implemented, and consider how the act falls short of a true human rights
guarantee in light of tradeoffs with bureaucratic legislators and resource
constrictions. As a result, NREGA shouldn’t really be considered as a guarantee
of a human right to work, but rather as an instrumental step in guaranteeing a
other human rights/capacities through a conditional basic income. This is not
disastrous for theoretical implications of NREGA, since the interpretation of the
right to work itself is open to a great deal of controversy centering around whether
to treat “work” as a verb or a noun, corresponding to it being an employment
guarantee as NREGA was originally envisioned or a more broad concept
encompassing union rights and restrictions on employer practices. However we
choose to consider NREGA and its intersection with human rights norms
theoretically, it suggests three aspects of the human rights framework I’ve
emphasized above—it centers guarantees in the state, implicitly conceptualizes
well-being as more than simply resource baskets, and provides opportunities for
international actors to discharge duties of assistance in support of institutional
growth through grassroots action.
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NREGA was passed in 2004, and was a crucial part of the Congress
party’s platform that drove them to victory in that year’s national elections. The
initial draft of the bill was generated by the National Advisory Council, which
until recently had the economist and frequent Sen collaborator Jean Drezé as a
member. That version of the bill demanded year-round employment at a minimum
wage for all Indians, but concerns about the astronomical potential cost to the
central government (outlay, in the Indian English idiom) caused a great restriction
of the bill as it passed through bureaucrats in the legislature. Drezé had to enlist
the hugely influential Sonia Gandhi to get the act passed at all, and it ended up
extremely convoluted (like most Indian legislation—the Indian constitution is the
longest written constitution in the world) and stopped short of a universal
employment guarantee. A national consortium of activists known as the Right to
Food Campaign played a key role in this process, and today is the main resource
for lobbying and implementation of the Act. They provide an excellent
summation of the entitlements and structure of NREGA that I will rehearse
below.61
In simplest outline, NREGA guarantees every rural household 100 days of
unskilled work each year at a state-mandated minimum wage, to be provided
within 15 days of a request for such work. The funding comes from the central
government while states are responsible for implementing the scheme—the Act is
the legislative basis for the practical Scheme—and the structure aims to guarantee
that the work be delivered in a timely manner by requiring that states pay an
unemployment allowance if work is not provided within 15 days. Rather than a
61
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top-down imposition of a public works scheme on villages, those in need must
request work, and this is what makes NREGA unique and rich under the theory
sketched above. There is a huge array of measures intended to prevent “leakage”
of funds, including the public posting of muster rolls and wages paid, as well as
the crucial contribution of the Right to Information Act, which has become a huge
asset in battling corruption all across rural India.62 The scheme is occasionally
presented as a guarantee of a right to work, but the restrictions required as
compromises preclude it from such a characterization.
Most obviously, the act only applies to rural households—it has nothing to
do for the urban poor, unless we consider its effect on reducing rural-urban
migration as a significant benefit in reducing competition in the underbelly of
urban labor markets. The guarantee is also only for households, defined almost
(although this is also complicated) as nuclear families. A sufficiently individual
realization of a human right to work would guarantee each person work. The
limitation to 100 days of work leaves the rest of the year unaccounted for, and
disallows the sort of basic security of both non-pecuniary and cash benefits
generated by a full-employment guarantee. In light of this restriction, we should
view NREGA as a safety net in the event of unexpected contingencies such as
drought or debt or sudden unemployment in a household. In this sense, NREGA is
more like a conditional resource transfer than a work guarantee.63 The conditions
for this transfer are unique and interesting, and exemplify a rights-based approach
to a state-sponsored redistributive mechanism.
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Other forms of social protection in India, such as subsidized food
distributed through the Public Distribution System, rely on targeting using a
Below Poverty Line measure. Based on a fantastically complicated census, some
families earn BPL cards that entitle them to discounted essential goods and others
don’t. This generates huge problems, including inaccuracies in the census, corrupt
practices such as illegitimate distribution or a secondary market in BPL cards, and
an inherently arbitrary determination of where the line lies. This empirical result
echoes some objections made to the capabilities-based schema for distributive
justice on which Pogge bases much of his critique while he defends a subtle
resourcist approach to redistribution.64 NREGA avoids this critique while still
serving an instrumental role in securing capabilities, in light of the perspective on
development and human rights I’ve sketched above. At no point in the allocation
of NREGA work does a BPL status come in. By mandating that the work is
physical and pays only minimum wage, the poor self-select to take up NREGA
work. Then the poor decide whether or not they need to receive assistance in
meeting their needs, and the problems associated with assessing how to allocate
redistributive payouts doesn’t arise. We can view this resource transfer as a
capability ensuring measure by viewing the cash paid as instrumental to securing
access to food or freedom from debt or any of the other capabilities enumerated in
the basic list. The advocacy for NREGA by the Right to Food campaign further
suggests that the legislation is an experiment in seeing how the government can
handle such self-targeted rights-based development initiatives. This is precisely
the sort of institution that Risse advocates as long-lasting and indigenously
64
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supported—the Act has no effect at all if no one asks for work, and crucially
relies on civil society to function properly. It also has the side-benefit of building
up badly-needed infrastructure that can have lasting benefits for the poor
population. It seems possible that NREGA, as an innovative and potentially
successful instrument to helping rural Indians secure human rights, can be a
grounds for some discharge of capacity-building guarantees that I’ve argued for
above.
Public awareness is crucial to the success of such a self-targeted scheme—
no one can ask for work that they are entitled to unless they know how to ask and
that they have the entitlement in the first place. International actors can participate
by funding local organizers, like Pratirodh, who act as mediators between the poor
and the state. There are some skepticisms to this approach to development, such
as an open concern about whether such workers will not themselves be corrupt in
the presence of foreign money and whether or not such work can be evaluated for
effectiveness, but I think it’s plausible to hold that international actors, whether
through official development assistance or individual contributions, can help
encourage this sort of action. A major problem with NREGA’s implementation is
the technical design of useful works within 5 km of the village—purely makework, like digging holes and filling them in or building roads sure to wash out in a
matter of months, will have little lasting effect and cause the non-pecuniary
benefits such as engagement with meaningful work to disappear. International
actors can further help with technical support, such as GIS data to plan projects or
assisting with design or providing decent tools for workers to use. The example-
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setting duty might be discharged by using laws such as NREGA to inspire
legislation even in rich countries—such a rights-based public-works program in
the US would potentially have a tremendous impact on reducing poverty, even
though poverty here is nowhere near as severe as it is in the Indian countryside.
The enactment of such legislation could add to a knowledge base of good practice
in other countries, and encourage the expansion of states guaranteeing human
rights through well-designed, people-focused legislation.
NREGA isn’t properly a guarantee of a human right to work, but it is a
compelling example of a state using human rights principles of grassroots
engagement and the input of the poor to generate an effective redistributive
mechanism that has the potential to have a serious impact on securing a basic set
of capabilities for a majority of India’s rural poor. If it truly adhered to human
rights principles, it would be more universal both in scope and days of work
guaranteed, and the continued pressure on the central government inspired by
those principles may one day deliver a legislatively guaranteed right to food that
would dramatically change the situation of the currently endemically
undernourished poor. Arguably access to proper nutrition is basic to all other
capabilities, and this eventual goal should be prime in developing the tangible
realization of a rights-based approach to human development. International actors
may discharge their duties of assistance most effectively by supporting these
legislative efforts and the implementation of the schemes in smart ways.
Assistance so delivered is durable, effective, and reinforces the primary role of
domestic institutions in guaranteeing human rights.
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Capstone Summary
In this project, I set out to examine an approach to human rights informed
by my experiences studying international development in India. Having directly
interacted with the rural poor in Rajasthan, I felt it necessary to theoretically
explore the groundings of a human rights conception that would be at once
relevant and practically beneficial for those people. In so doing, I read many
accounts of human rights, deepening coursework I took on the philosophy of
human rights in fall 2009, and arrived at conclusions at once pragmatist and
committed to a traditional, orthodox account of human rights.
Rather than search for a philosophically best account, I proceeded with the
idea that a particular conception of human rights is the best account for a
particular end. Some conceptions give an account of how human rights justify
military intervention. Some aim to explain what philosophically justifies the array
of international law instruments and international institutions that make up the
human rights regime. Some look to human rights as a prescription for forming a
more just global society. I could go on, but I set out to see how human rights
could justify tangible action to combat the pervasive and morally repugnant state
of global poverty, and examine how such a conception might inform the exercise
of international aid in domestic law.
The project begins with a lengthy discussion of one of the most influential
thinkers in the discourse, Thomas Pogge. His human rights system gets off the
ground with the idea that the amount of death caused by preventable poverty is a
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equivalent to a moral disaster—so many people die each year due to extreme
poverty that there must be something deeply wrong about the way we’ve
structured the world. Pogge sees human rights as demands on the structure of a
global society that he sees as inherently unjust, since it perpetuates structural
impositions on poor countries and the poor themselves that have no normative
justification. I find Pogge’s work extremely interesting and compelling, and the
amount of time I spend discussing his views is a tribute to their influence. I raise a
series of worries about the details of Pogge’s approach. They mostly center
around an intermediary move in his argumentative structure. Pogge stipulates that
human rights are essentially negative—that is, they are claims to refrain from
doing something. In order to get tangible effect from such rights, he must show
that the people in a position to give rectification for violating these restraints on
just action are morally culpable for harming the poor. There are serious empirical
issues with establishing harm at all.
I transition from discussing Pogge’s work into some of the arguments
Mathias Risse raises against this idea of harming. These focus on empirical issues
in showing how a benchmark for harm might be specified. To make a judgement
that harming is going on, it must be possible to state a benchmark of something
below which there is no harm going on—we must be able to compare a harmed
state to an unharmed state. Risse considers several possibilities that Pogge might
use to specify the harm he claims, and rejects them all. The upshot of this
exchange for my argument is that specifying any such benchmark may turn out to
be impossible if not much more difficult than Pogge seems to let on.
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Risse suggests that some harm is going on from the rich to the poor, but it
is very restricted. He posits an institutional thesis from development economics to
motivate this, which states that the source of prosperity is the quality of
institutions in any society. As a result, rich countries harm poor ones only by not
helping poor countries build up stronger institutions. The ability rich countries
have to do this is extremely limited by the nature of institutions and the nature of
aid. I raise some issues for Risse’s approach here, mostly that it is too restrictive
in assigning foreign aid—if international actors may only help strengthen local
institutions, there seems to be no way to address the very urgent problem of
poverty. Instead, I subscribe to an expanded notion of the institutional thesis,
acknowledging both that a wide array of factors play into the efficacy of
institutions and that a wide array of factors plays into causing poverty. Both duties
of immediate redistributive transfers and institutional capacity building should be
endorsed by a conception of human rights—there’s no reason to choose one or the
other, and sufficiently generous readings of Pogge and Risse might yield some
common ground.
I move from here to consider Risse’s particular derivation of human rights.
It depends on natural rights—those possessed by natural facts about human’s
moral status—that secure a claim of every human to the basic goods necessary for
subsistence. These derive from a notion of common ownership of the Earth
resurrected from 17th century political philosophy. From these, Risse argues that
the imposition of a global order, defined by the continuous territorial control of
states and the global governance institutions that regulate their relations, causes
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each human to enjoy status in that global order. Since states implicitly restrict the
natural rights each person has to fulfilling basic needs with original resources,
human rights are necessary to adjust for this restriction. These human rights are
essentially associative rights gotten in virtue of the contingent fact of membership
in the global order. I argue that the global order may not be as homogenous as
Risse claims, and may not ever be. Further, resting human rights on a concept of
membership, however thin, may inappropriately limit that human rights
conception’s capability to combat the exclusion of people who most need human
rights secured.
Having found these two recent and innovative approaches to human rights
unsatisfying, I turn to an orthodox account of human rights that grounds them in
facts about what it is to be human. Much of the philosophical fervor around
human rights explicitly sets out to avoid such commitments, but I find Martha
Nussbaum’s roughly neo-Aristotlean approach that has human capabilities both as
the ends and grounds for human rights compelling enough to suggest it as an
alternative to the above views. Capabilities shift a focus away from basic goods to
the question of what a person can do and be. In coming up with a list of
capabilities, Nussbaum makes normative claims about what it is to be human.
This principle generates a list of essential capabilities—things that are morally
valuable and essential to human life—from which we can derive an intersection
with human rights. Capabilities both give the desired outcome of human rights
and a justification for their existence. The assignment of duties to realize human
rights on this approach follows a standard progress from universal individual
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responsibilities—that everyone has a duty to everyone else to ensure that they
have the capabilities deemed valuable—to institutionalization via collective
responsibilities. I argue that this approach can yield the responsibilities of aid that
were deemed important by Risse and Pogge with less-objectionable middle steps
in the argument. In response to the concern that a justification for an account of
what it is to be human won’t be forthcoming, I introduce Rorty’s notion that
human rights are purely a function of human sentiment—roughly, the capability
to empathize and feel compassion for even distant others—and link that to
Nussbaum’s insistence that a commitment to an account of humanness is required
for any sentiment at all. This allows the argument to avoid justification in a
convoluted way—human rights uncontroversially depend on sentiment, and
sentiment depends on an account of human functioning. The mutuality of these
two claims is justification enough. The institutionalized collective duties of
assistance can and ought to be exercised in ways concordant with Risse’s
admonitions about institutional support and Pogge’s about institutional reform.
I close the paper with a discussion of the recently enacted National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act in India. I point out that it is not properly a guarantee
of a right to work, but serves as an instrumental policy in guaranteeing a more
fundamental capability to subsistence by acting as a conditional redistributive
mechanism. NREGA is an important example of a domestic institutional
innovation that puts power in the hands of the poor and ensures capabilities
universally. By being self-targeted, it avoids some of the issues generated by a
need to evaluate who has what capability deficits in that the poor choose what
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assistance they need. International actors have an opportunity to help with
NREGA and other similar institutional innovations through a process of capacity
building in line with the discharge of the collective duties generated by the
preferred conception of human rights argued for above.

